Source: Boiling Frogs Post
Andrew Gavin Marshall
In
the midst of World War II, Saudi Arabia secured a position of enormous
significance to the rising world power, America. With its oil reserves
essentially untapped, the House of Saud became a strategic ally of
immense importance, “a matter of national security, nourishing U.S.
military might and enhancing the potentiality of postwar American
hegemony.” Saudi Arabia welcomed the American interest as it sought to
distance itself from its former imperial master, Britain, which it
viewed with suspicion as the British established Hashemite kingdoms in
the Middle East – the old rivals of the Saudis – in Jordan and Iraq.[1]
The
Saudi King rose to power and established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
1927 and made formal ties with the United States in 1931. An oil
concession was soon granted to the Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil of
California, and thereafter, large quantities of oil were discovered in
the Kingdom, thus increasing the importance of the Saudi monarch. This
was especially true during World War II, when access to and control over
petroleum reserves were of the utmost importance in determining the
course of the war. In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged as
much when he signed Executive Order 8926, which stated that, “the
defense of Saudi Arabia [is] vital to the defense of the United
States.”[3] United States Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes,
several months earlier, suggested to President Roosevelt that the United
States be more involved in organizing oil concessions in Saudi Arabia
not only for the war effort, but “to counteract certain known activities
of a foreign power which presently are jeopardizing American interests
in Arabian oil reserves.” That “foreign power” was Great Britain. In
fact, there was immense distrust of British intentions in the Middle
East, and specifically in Saudi Arabia, on the part of the State
Department’s Division of Near East Affairs (NEA). A great deal of this
tension and antagonism, however, emerged from Saudi diplomacy which
sought to play off the two great powers against one another in the hopes
of securing for itself a better deal.[4]
Andrew Gavin Marshall
“One of the Greatest Material Prizes in World History”
In
the midst of World War II, Saudi Arabia secured a position of enormous
significance to the rising world power, America. With its oil reserves
essentially untapped, the House of Saud became a strategic ally of
immense importance, “a matter of national security, nourishing U.S.
military might and enhancing the potentiality of postwar American
hegemony.” Saudi Arabia welcomed the American interest as it sought to
distance itself from its former imperial master, Britain, which it
viewed with suspicion as the British established Hashemite kingdoms in
the Middle East – the old rivals of the Saudis – in Jordan and Iraq.[1]
The Saudi monarch, Abdul Aziz bin
Abdul Rahman al Saud had to contend not only with the reality of Arab
nationalism spreading across the Arab world (something which he would
have to rhetorically support to legitimate his rule, but strategically maneuver through in order to maintain
his rule), but he would also play off the United States and Great
Britain against one another to try to ensure a better deal for ‘the
Kingdom’, and ensure that his rivals – the Hashemites – in Jordan and
Iraq did not spread their influence across the region. Amir (King)
Abdullah of Transjordan – the primary rival to the Saudi king – sought
to establish a “Greater Syria” following World War II, which would
include Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and not to
mention, the Hejaz province in Saudi Arabia. The image and potential of a
“Greater Syria” was central in the mind of King Abdul Aziz. The means
through which the House of Saud would seek to prevent such a maneuver
and protect the ‘Kingdom’ was to seek Western protection. As the United
States had extensive oil interests in the Kingdom, it seemed a natural
corollary that the United States government should become the
‘protector’ of Saudi Arabia, especially since the British, long the
primary imperial hegemon of the region (with France a close second), had
put in place the Hashemites in Transjordan and Iraq.[2] For the Saudis,
the British could not be trusted.
The
Saudi King rose to power and established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
1927 and made formal ties with the United States in 1931. An oil
concession was soon granted to the Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil of
California, and thereafter, large quantities of oil were discovered in
the Kingdom, thus increasing the importance of the Saudi monarch. This
was especially true during World War II, when access to and control over
petroleum reserves were of the utmost importance in determining the
course of the war. In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged as
much when he signed Executive Order 8926, which stated that, “the
defense of Saudi Arabia [is] vital to the defense of the United
States.”[3] United States Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes,
several months earlier, suggested to President Roosevelt that the United
States be more involved in organizing oil concessions in Saudi Arabia
not only for the war effort, but “to counteract certain known activities
of a foreign power which presently are jeopardizing American interests
in Arabian oil reserves.” That “foreign power” was Great Britain. In
fact, there was immense distrust of British intentions in the Middle
East, and specifically in Saudi Arabia, on the part of the State
Department’s Division of Near East Affairs (NEA). A great deal of this
tension and antagonism, however, emerged from Saudi diplomacy which
sought to play off the two great powers against one another in the hopes
of securing for itself a better deal.[4]
In
December 2010, as it seemed the Greek crisis might still be resolved
without the by-now huge bailouts or privatizations, Greece’s Energy
Ministry formed a special group of experts to research the prospects for
oil and gas in Greek waters. Greece’s Energean Oil & Gas began
increased investment into drilling in the offshore waters after a
successful smaller oil discovery in 2009. Major geological surveys were
made. Preliminary estimates now are that total offshore oil in Greek
waters exceeds 22 billion barrels in the Ionian Sea off western Greece
and some 4 billion barrels in the northern Aegean Sea.
